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LABOR LAw-LMRA-STATUS OF A WALKOUT PROMPTED BY HEALTH REA-
SONS IN THE FACE OF A No-STRIKE CLAUSE-The employer and the union 
were covered by a contract which contained a no-strike clause. In spite of 
this agreement, buffers in the employer's plant walked off their jobs1 when 
a blower2 in the buffing room failed to carry away dust and cool the area 
properly.a The trial examiner found that the walkout was a protected 
1 The findings of fact indicate that the blower had broken down twice before. On 
August 28th all the buffers were sent home while it was being repaired. Apparently the 
trouble was corrected, but when the morning shift reported for work on August 31st, the 
blower was still not operating properly, and the employer again shut down for repairs. 
The afternoon shift began work at 3:30 and complained of heat and excessive dust and 
lint, but the employer, after making a "cigar smoke test," claimed that the blower was 
in proper order and warned the men to continue working or face dismissal. The entire 
shift walked off the job at 5:15. There was also some evidence that one employee on the 
next morning shift "quit" rather than work in the buffing room. 
2 The blower was required under Michigan Compiled Laws (1948) §408.66, a fact 
which, though not emphasized, may have buttressed the charge that, without such equip-
ment, the buffing room was "abnormally dangerous." 
3 Evidence showed that the temperature in the buffing room reached ll0° and that 
the air was clouded with metal and abrasive dust. Experts testified that prolonged work 
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concerted activity and not a strike, and that the employer had therefore 
committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to permit the buffers to 
return to their jobs when the blower had been repaired.4 On exceptions 
taken to these findings, the NLRB reviewed and accepted the trial exam-
iner's report. The walkout was a protected concerted activity, in spite of 
the no-strike clause, by virtue of section 502 of the Labor-Management 
Relations Act,5 which specifically excepts walkouts engaged in in good faith 
and prompted by abnormally dangerous conditions of work from the defi-
nition of a strike.6 Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. No. 6, 38 L.R.R.M. 
1194 (1956). 
Although the broad problem of a work stoppage in the face of a no-strike 
clause has frequ<::ntly been considered, this case is significant in that it 
explores a new, if somewhat limited, area of that problem. Previous to this 
decision, the Sixth Circuit had held that spontaneous walkouts and tempo-
rary work stoppages prompted by health reasons were protected concerted 
activities under section 7 of the amended National Labor Relations Act.7 
In that case, however, a no-strike clause was not involved. Whenever such 
a clause has been present, both state and federal courts have generally held 
that any work stoppage is a violation,8 although a recent Supreme Court 
decision makes an exception for stoppages called in protest against an 
employer's unfair labor practices.9 A work stoppage for health reasons, 
however, had never been considered.1° This case involved both issues, and 
under such conditions could produce nausea, headaches, serious cases of "heat sickness," 
and even eventual death. 
4 The employer's refusal to permit the afternoon shift of buffers to return to their 
jobs led to a walkout of approximately two-thirds of his employees. Additional charges 
against the employer of interference with this concerted activity, discrimination, and re-
fusal to bargain were upheld by the trial examiner and enforced by the Board. 
5 " ••• nor shall the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good faith 
because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of employment of such 
employee or employees be deemed a strike under this Act." 61 Stat. 162 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 
(1952) § I 43. 
6 Defined in §501 (2) of the L.M.R.A. 61 Stat. 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §142 (2). 
7 NLRB v. Southern Silk Mills, Inc., (6th Cir. 1953) 209 F. (2d) 155, rehearing den. 
(6th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 824. 
SE.g., NLRB v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., (9th Cir. 1954) 217 F. (2d) 366; 
General Electric Co. v. International UAW, 93 Ohio App. 139, 108 N.E. (2d) 211 (1952). 
Other cases are summarized in 2 CCH Lab. Law Rep., 4th ed., ,i,i3170.18, 4045.88, 4070.27, 
4085.75, 4090.59, 4095.06, and in the all states section of vols. 5 and 6 (1956). 
9 Mastro Plastic Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). Although not directly in point 
here, this case opens up the possibility of interpreting the no-strike clause to exclude 
various stoppages, including perhaps one prompted by health hazards. The result should 
call for a more careful wording of such clauses, in the interests of union and management 
alike. Whether or not state courts will agree with the federal rationale is still an open 
question. 
10 The decision most nearly approaching this is Waterfront Employers Assn., 4 Lab. 
Arb. Rep. 234 (1946). The contract there contained a clause forbidding strikes, with a 
specific exception for health stoppages, but the union made no specific contention that 
health hazards were involved, and the arbitrator found no such hazards present. The 
decision in Corning Glass Works, 6 Lab. Arb. Rep. 533 (1947), included as dicta a quo-
tation from Ford Motor Co., 3 Lab. Arb. Rep. 779 (1944), which declared, also as dicta, 
that employees might forego grievance procedures when an order given for immediate 
execution endangered health. 
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the Board answered the question it presented by invoking a phrase of Taft-
Hartley never before interpreted.11 The statute is so explicit in covering 
this particular problem that, given a contract and set of facts within its 
scope,12 there can be no question as to the Board's decision that such a 
walkout13 is a protected activity and not a strike. A question may well arise, 
however, as to what is within its scope. Unions may seize on opportunities 
to protect a walkout otherwise violative of a no-strike clause behind bogus 
charges of health hazards, while employers may in tum label as a sham 
union charges of that kind, including those which are valid.14 In a con-
curring opinion, Member Rodgers declared that he would keep the scope 
narrow by requiring proof that working conditions were objectively dan-
gerous to health rather than a mere showing that the employees subjectively, 
though reasonably, thought they were.15 The :Soard majority likewise used 
objective standards in examining the evidence, but did not declare itself to 
be so bound in future cases. In addition, the statute requires a separate 
and distinct finding that the stoppage was in good faith,16 although in 
practice such a finding, if not carefully differentiated, could become little 
more than a conclusion from proof of objectively dangerous working condi-
tions. Previous decisions would also suggest that the dangerous conditions 
must be of a type which requires immediate action rather than those which 
can be safely corrected through the more drawn out operation of the griev-
11 See note 5 supra. 
12 Although the statute is explicit, there appears to be no reason why the union may 
not contract just as explicitly to forego self help even in the face of a health hazard. Both 
the trial examiner and the Board ignored this possibility here. Yet, even if the union had 
so contracted here, grievances cannot always be processed in a few hours, and to require 
employees to remain at their jobs for even those few hours, under conditions present here, 
could well have resulted in serious illness and possible death. Section 502 is still necessary, 
even with a broad specific no-strike clause. 
13 The language used in the statute, i.e., "quitting of labor by an employee or employ-
ees," is broad enough to cover not only walkouts but any form of work stoppage. 
14 In fact, the employer in this case argued strenuously that the union was only using 
the blower breakdown as an excuse to conceal its real reasons for striking. The employer 
claimed that various economic grievances being processed were the real cause of the strike, 
and Member Bean, though concurring, also had some doubts on the good faith of the 
union stand. 
15 Waterfront Employers Association, note 10 supra, requires the same objective proof. 
However, the Southern Silk Mills case, note 7 supra, at 155, holds that a walkout prompted 
by "what they (the employees) not unreasonably considered excessive heat" is a protected 
concerted activity under §7 of the amended NLRA. As noted above, no mention was made 
of either a no-strike clause or §502. The absence of the former should have no controlling 
effect on the court's interpretation, but the wording of the latter (see note 5 supra) might 
incline a court to an objective view. Or the difference may simply be one of philosophy 
which is yet to be worked out. 
16 Perhaps the separate statement of a specific requirement of good faith in the statute 
demands this construction. At least such a construction makes it clear that the union must 
honestly call any work stoppages for reasons of health and nothing else. 
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ance procedures.11 Kept within these bounds, section 502 should prove to 
be an effective and salutary limitation upon a broad no-strike clause con-
tract.is 
Robert E. Hammell, S.Ed. 
17 Note 8 supra, and Ford Motor Co., note IO supra. 
18 Or, if problems become acute enough, it may lead to a stricter and more detailed 
wording of the no-strike clause. See Daykin, "The No-Strike Clause," 11 UNIV. Prrr. L 
R.Ev. 13 (1949), on this possibility in particular, and on the entire no-strike clause question 
in general. 
